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Abstract 
The effects of the liberalization of international trade are analyzed in a New Economic Geography 
model of a country with an asymmetric distribution of housing between regions. Labour is mobile 
between regions but not between countries. Trade liberalization tends to reduce inequalities in the 
distribution of population between the two regions, although population is always more unequally 
distributed than housing. Results are similar when there is a bias in preferences towards home-produced 
varieties of manufactures. If consumers care relatively little about housing and transport costs are high 
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Most of the literature dealing with the geographical effects of trade liberalization considers that each 
country engaged in the process is internally homogeneous (e.g. Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 
1995 and 1996; Venables, 1996; Helpman, 1998). This paper addresses the effects on different regions of 
a country of a reduction in that country’s barriers to external trade. Does the promotion of trade intensify 
or reduce regional disparities inside the country? This question acquires more importance when we look 
at the behaviour of some developing countries that since the middle of the 1970s, and mostly during the 
1990s, adopted policies more oriented to the external markets. 
The approach we follow is to extend the two-region model of Helpman (1998), in which consumers’ utility 
depends on the consumption of manufactures, which are produced under increasing returns to scale, and  
on the consumption of a non-traded good whose supply is fixed and immobile (“housing”). A significant 
advantage of this model is that it can easily incorporate asymmetries between the regions, by allowing the 
distribution of housing to be unequal, which is more realistic than the usual symmetric model. We follow 
the route pioneered by Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) of adding to the model a third region (the rest 
of the world or ROW), trade with which involves costs at least as high as between domestic regions. 
We find is that, except in certain cases when inter-regional transport costs are very high, reducing barriers 
to international trade tends to reduce the inequality in the distribution of population between the two 
regions (although it always remains more unequally distributed than the stock of housing). This effect 
arises because the consumption of home manufactures becomes less important relative to the 
consumption of housing when there is more trade with the rest of the world. 
If consumers have a bias in favour of manufactures produced domestically, the qualitative results remain 
unchanged. However, in the presence of consumption biases, the effect of trade liberalization on regions’ 
size tends to be larger except in the case of extreme preferences for home-produced manufactures. This 
happens because changes in trade protection matter very little when consumers’ desire for imported 
varieties shrinks to zero. 
 
   1
1. Introduction 
 
Does the promotion of international trade intensify or reduce regional disparities 
inside the country? 
The standard theoretical approach to this issue builds on the New Economic 
Geography (NEG) model introduced by Krugman (1991), in which there is a tension 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces. Centripetal forces arise from increasing returns 
to scale in one sector (manufacturing) combined with transport costs between 
regions/countries. Centrifugal forces arise either from an immobile factor of production in 
another sector (agriculture) that employs an exogenously given proportion of the labour 
force, as in Krugman and Venables (1995), or from congestion or commuting costs that 
rise with regional population Fujita et al. (1999), Alonso-Villar (2001) and Murata and 
Thisse (2005).  
These alternative ways of modelling centrifugal forces produce opposite 
conclusions about the effect of the liberalization of the effect of international trade on the 
regional concentration of economic activity. Monfort and Nicolini (2000), Paluzie (2001), 
Crozet and Koening-Soubeyran (2002) all use models with an immobile factor of 
production, and find that trade liberalization increases regional concentration. Alonso-Villar 
(2001) considers a model with congestion costs, and finds the opposite result.  
The difference in the results arising from the two ways dispersion forces are 
generated is clearly explained by Alonso-Villar (2001), “The two centrifugal forces, 
congestion costs and the immobile demand represented by farmers, have different effects 
on concentration and it should be emphasised that the effects of other parameters, such 
as transport, can differ depending on the kind of centrifugal force one considers. By 
considering immobile farmers, concentration is more likely when transport costs are low, 
because in that case firms do not increase their benefits by moving closer to the dispersed 
farmers. Conversely, by considering congestion costs, when transport costs between 
locations decrease concentration is more difficult, since more citizens will want to move to 
a smaller city where congestion is lower, without paying much for transport costs when 
delivering goods”. 
This paper also considers a model with congestion costs. It develops the two-
region model of Helpman (1998), in which consumers’ utility depends partly on the 
consumption of a non-traded good whose supply is fixed and immobile (“housing”). An 
advantage of this model is that it can easily incorporate asymmetries between the regions, 
by allowing the distribution of housing to be unequal, which is more realistic than the usual 
symmetric model. We follow the route pioneered by Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) of 
adding to the model a third region (the rest of the world or ROW), trade with which involves   2
costs at least as high as between domestic regions. What we find is that, except in certain 
cases when inter-regional transport costs are very high, reducing barriers to international 
trade tends to reduce the inequality in the distribution of population between the two 
regions (although it always remains more unequally distributed than the stock of housing). 
This effect arises because the consumption of home manufactures becomes less 
important relative to the consumption of housing when there is higher consumption of 
manufactured imports. We also consider an extension of the model in which consumers 
have a preference for home manufactures. 
 
2. The  Model 
 
Let us assume that the world is composed of three geographical areas (1, 2, and 3), with 
Regions 1 and 2 belonging to the same country (the domestic economy) and Region 3 
playing the role of the ROW. In each region consumers have a two-tier utility function. The 
upper tier, which takes a Cobb-Douglas form, determines the consumers’ division of 
expenditure between manufactured goods and housing services. The second tier takes the 
usual “love for variety” form (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), and dictates 
consumer preferences over manufactured varieties. Manufactured goods are traded 
internally (between Regions 1 and 2) and internationally (between Regions 1 and 2 and 
the ROW). Trade between domestic regions is subject to transport costs that take the well-
known Samuelson iceberg form
1. In the case of trade with the ROW, exports to the ROW 
are frictionless, while imports are subject to iceberg costs that cannot be lower than those 
for inter-regional trade.
2 Manufactured varieties are produced using only labour, with the 
sector being organized as a monopolistic competitive market, and production exhibits 
increasing returns to scale. Housing services are not tradable, with the supply in each 
region being fixed. Finally, labour is mobile between domestic regions but immobile 
internationally. All of these assumptions are similar to those of Helpman (1998), except 
that in our model the country that reduces trade barriers on imports, the domestic 
economy, is composed of two (possibly asymmetric) regions. In Helpman (1998) the two 




Consumers’ utility in region i takes the following form:  
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where  i q  is the per capita consumption of housing, and  i m  makes reference to the CES 
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where  ( )i ck  is the per capita consumption of variety k in Region i, and n is the mass or 
number of available varieties produced by the three regions ( ) 123 nnn n =++ . Under this 
specification, the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, as well as the 
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The Cobb-Douglas utility function, together with the CES function for  i m , means 
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where  ()
j
i pk  is the consumer price in Region i of variety k produced in Region j,  i E  is 
total expenditure in Region i, and  mi P  is the price index of the differentiated goods in 
Region i.  
Trade between Regions 1 and 2 is subject to iceberg costs equal to t 1 ≥ , while 
imports from the ROW incur costs equal to τ , with  t 1 τ ≥≥, which implies the following 
relationships between producer  ( )j pk  and consumer  ()
j









      for 
     for  ,   , 1,2
    for  1,2








pk pk i j












Production of each manufactured variety uses only labour, and is subject to increasing 
returns to scale. More specifically, the demand for labour by each firm in Region i to 
produce variety k is: 
( ) ( )  
ii lk f v cxk =+            ( 5 )    4
where  ( )i xk  is the quantity produced of variety k by a firm located in region i,  while 
0 f >  and  0 vc >  are, respectively, the fixed and variable requirements of labour. The 
existence of fixed costs gives rise to increasing returns to scale, so each variety k is 
produced just by a single firm, because it is not profitable for two or more firms to produce 
the same variety. 
Assuming firms seek to maximize profits, the producer price of each variety 
produced in Region i is equal to: 
()
1
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= , we have: 
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  As we can see, all firms located in the same region set the same price. Assuming 
free entry and exit of firms such that in equilibrium firms achieve zero profit 
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  Choosing units such that  1 f ε = , we have:  
1 x =             ( 7 )  
As equation (7) shows, the scale of production is constant and identical for all firms 
independently of where they are located. Assuming full employment we have: 
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2.3. Equilibrium  conditions 
 
The equilibrium condition for each manufactured variety produced either in Region 1 or 2 
requires supply and demand to be equal. For Region 1 we have: 
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where the terms on the right hand side are, respectively, the total demand (including the 
quantity that melts in transit), by consumers of Regions 1, 2 and 3, of each variety 
produced in Region 1. Similar conditions hold for Regions 2 and 3. In condition (9)  mi P  is   5
the manufactured price index for region i, which is a decreasing function of the number of 
varieties locally produced: 
() ()
()
mi i i j j Pn pn t p n p i j i j
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Assuming that housing is owned by absentee landlords
5, total expenditure by 
residents of Region i is equal to: 
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With labour being mobile between domestic regions, we have that in equilibrium 
real incomes in Regions 1 and 2 must be equal. For the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the 
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where  hi P is the price of housing services in Region i. 
Assuming the total stock of housing in the domestic economy is H, and a share  1 h  
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In equilibrium, and if the two domestic regions have a positive population, we have: 
12 1 1 2 2 0 uu VVV w P w P =−= − =       ( 1 6 )  
If for a given population distribution indirect utilities are not equalized across 
domestic regions ( ) 0 V ≠ , migration is governed by the following ad hoc migration 
equation (Baldwin, et al., 2003): 
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3.  Characterizing the equilibrium
6 
 
3.1.  A symmetric distribution of housing 
 
Because any difference in real wages between the regions stimulates migration, there are 
two types of equilibrium: where the real wages are equal in the two regions, or where the 
whole of the population is in one region, but any person moving to the other region would 
receive a lower real wage. When the distribution of housing is symmetric, a symmetric 
distribution of labour is always an equilibrium, but it is not always a stable equilibrium. 
Stability can be tested by solving for the relative wage in the two regions as a function of 
the distribution of labour, and plotting the result. If the region with a slightly larger labour 
force has a higher (lower) real wage, the symmetric equilibrium is unstable (stable). 
As is the case with Helpman’s model, the share of income expended on housing 
( ) β  and the elasticity of substitution between varieties ( ) ε  are critical parameters. A high 
elasticity of substitution means that consumers care less about the available number of 
manufactured varieties, and a high β  means that housing has a greater weight in their 
preferences. The outcome differs according to whether the product of these two 
parameters is high ( ) 1 βε > , in which case consumers care strongly about housing, or 
whether the product is low () 1 βε <  and housing is relatively unimportant.  
When consumers care strongly about housing ( ) 1 βε > , the simulations show that 
the symmetric equilibrium is always stable, whatever the level of transport costs (t and τ ) 
(Figure 1). When L1 < L2 (s1 < 0.5), then Region 1 always has a higher wage, inducing 
migration that raises L1 and reduces L2. Murata and Thisse (2005) obtain a similar result. 
In their case, dispersion forces are generated by congestion costs rather than by a fixed 
supply of housing. If congestions costs are high enough and manufactured varieties are 
close substitutes (high ε), a dispersed equilibrium is stable unless transport costs are too 
high. The reason for this is that for a high elasticity of substitution consumers benefit little 
from access to a large number of varieties, so the negative effect of increasing commuting 
costs as population agglomerates in a single region more than compensates for the lower 
transport costs of having a larger number of varieties locally produced. 
In the opposite case, when  1 βε < , the symmetrical equilibrium is stable only when 
transport costs are relatively low (Figure 2). If inter-regional transport costs are very low (t 
= 1.1), the symmetrical equilibrium is stable for all values of international transport costs. 
Conversely, if inter-regional transport costs are very high (t = 50), the symmetrical 
equilibrium is always unstable, and the stable equilibrium has 100 % of the population in   7
one region or the other.
7 In the intermediate case shown (t = 2.3), the symmetrical 
equilibrium is stable for free trade
8  ( ) 23 . τ = , but not for higher values, and for most 
values of τ  there are two stable equilibriums with an unequal distribution of population in 
the two regions. 
The difference between the two cases is that, when  1 βε < , consumers care 
mainly about consumption of more varieties of manufactures, and are willing to sacrifice a 
lot of housing to achieve that by living in the more populated region.  
 
3.2.  An asymmetric distribution of housing 
 
Now let us assume that Region 1 always has more housing than region 2 ( ) 1 12 h >  
Figure 3 shows the outcomes for  1 06 . h = , for three values of inter-regional trade costs (t 
= 1.1, 2.3 and 50), when  1 βε > . As was the case when  1 12 h =   (Figure 1), the 
equilibrium is always stable, but now the share of population in Region 1 is always greater 
than 0.6, and increases with t, because higher inter-regional transport costs make it harder 
to import extra varieties of manufactures from the other region. 
Figure 4 shows the case where  1 βε < , again with  1 06 . h = , which corresponds to 
Figure 2 for the symmetric case. As in the symmetric case, a stable equilibrium with high t 
is where the whole population is agglomerated in one region. With low t, there is a stable 
equilibrium with the population distributed approximately in proportion to the distribution of 
housing, whatever the level of international trade costs. With t = 2.3 the picture is 
somewhat more complicated. A stable but strongly asymmetric equilibrium ( ) 1 08 . s >  
arises under relatively low barriers to international trade. At high τ , there is a stable 
equilibrium where Region 2 is empty of population and another stable equilibrium where 
Region 1 is either empty or has a very small population (this is a consequence of the 
asymmetric distribution of housing). 
An interesting result that emerges under an asymmetric distribution of housing is 
that the dispersed equilibrium, either stable or unstable, means population is distributed 
differently from that of housing. This result can be proved as follows. In first place, we have 
that a symmetric distribution of population cannot be an equilibrium, for LL 12 = , nominal 
wages are identical in both regions such that the price index of manufactures is also the 
same  () mm PP 12 = . However, since HH 12 > , the price of housing is cheaper in region 1 
() hh PP 12 <  , this means  12 0 VV −>  for LL 12 = . Then, with an asymmetric distribution of 
housing, population must be also asymmetrically distributed in equilibrium. Two   8
possibilities arise, LL 12 >  or LL 12 < . For any population distribution () LL 12 ,  to be an 













. Using (14), and the fact that in the 
























. Given the assumption that housing stock is larger in region 1 than in 
region 2, an special case to look at is when LL HH 12 1 21 = > . If LL HH 12 1 21 =>  
were an equilibrium, using equation (14) allows to obtain that in this case the relative price 







=            ( 1 8 )  
Looking at equation (18) and the condition for LL 12 > , we have 
LL HH 12 1 21 =>  cannot be an equilibrium. 
From the simulations, two cases can be identified. On the one hand, when the 
dispersed equilibrium is stable, the simulations show that in equilibrium LL HH 12 1 2 > . 
As Figures 3 and 4 show, this outcome arises when  1 βε > , and for  1 βε <  and domestic 
trade costs low enough. On the other hand, if the dispersed equilibrium is unstable, the 
opposite scenario takes place, with LL HH 12 1 2 <  in equilibrium. This case takes place 
for  1 βε <  and when domestic trade costs are high enough, or for intermediate domestic 
trade costs and high enough international trade costs. 
 
4. Trade  liberalization 
 
In this section we focus on the effects of a reduction of import protection on the regional 
distribution of population in the dispersed stable equilibrium, when the distribution of 
housing is asymmetric. 
The spatial distribution of economic activity between domestic regions results from 
the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. What are the potential effects that a 
reduction in τ may produce? With consumers looking for consuming a positive amount of 
every variety, we have that if the prices of manufactured varieties were the same, 
consumption of each variety will also be identical. However, under the existence of   9
transports costs, the consumption of varieties produced domestically is larger, then, ceteris 
paribus, consumers have an incentive to live where the number of locally produced 
varieties is larger. As τ is reduced the there is a substitution effect in favour of imported 
varieties. With the consumption of imported varieties becoming more important, we may 
then expect the price of housing having a greater incidence on the decision where to live. 
So, as τ is reduced, populations should tend to distribute more in line with the supply of 
housing. As we can expect from the results of former section, the effects driven by 
changes in τ depend on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between 
manufactured varieties (ε), as well as on the share of housing in the total expenditure (β). 
Figure 5 shows how the share of labour in Region 1 varies with the level of 
international trade costs ( ) τ , for given values of domestic trade costs (t), when Region 1 
has 60 % of the housing stock () 1 06 . h = . We focus on the cases where there is a single 
stable equilibrium with non-zero labour in Region 2 at all levels of trade protection. 
When  1 βε >  and inter-regional trade costs are high (t = 50, Figure 5A), trade 
liberalization makes almost no difference to the distribution of labour, which is always 
extremely asymmetric ( ) 1 09 7 . s > . For intermediate domestic transport costs (t = 2.3) the 
effects are quite large, with  1 s  falling from 0.93 for  10 τ =  to under 0.82 with free trade 
(Figure 5B). As t becomes very low (t = 1.1) the effects are smaller because even at high 
values of τ   1 s  does not exceed 0.64 (Figure 5C). 
As said before,  1 βε >  means consumers care more about the price of housing. In 
addition, if domestic transport costs are high enough, and under the assumption that τ > t, 
the consumption of manufactured varieties produced by the ROW is almost nil. Then, 
changes in τ have almost no effect on the spatial distribution of firms between domestic 
regions. At the other extreme, if t is low enough such that the consumption of varieties 
produced in the other domestic region is not too costly, the distribution of population 
across the two domestic regions is mainly driven by the cost of housing, then a reduction 
in τ has just a small effect on the distribution of population. It is when t takes intermediate 
values that a change of it has a larger influence on s1.  Thus, for  1 βε >  domestic trade 
costs have to fall within a certain range for international trade liberalization to have a 
substantial effect on the regional distribution of population in this model. 
When  1 βε <  consumers are more sensitive to the number of manufactured 
varieties, as well as housing has a more important role when deciding where to live. As 
imported varieties become cheaper due to the reduction in τ, consumers substitute 
consumption of varieties produced by the ROW for local varieties. Then, a reduction of τ   10
increases the relative importance of housing costs, inducing a migration from the larger to 
the smaller region (Figure 5D). 
 
5. Consumption  bias 
 
A property of the manufactured composite index mi as defined by equation (2) is that, in 
the absence of transport costs ( ) 1 t τ = =  consumption of manufactures is distributed 
proportionally to the number of varieties, that is, each consumer of region i=1,2,3 spends a 
proportion  ( ) 123 j nnnn ++  in goods produced in region j=1,2,3. If the domestic 
economy is small with respect to the ROW, this outcome means a disproportionately large 
import ratio. Table 1 shows the figures when the country represents only 1 % of the world 
economy. Even with import protection, the participation of varieties produced by the ROW 
is still larger than tends to be observed in reality, even for extremely high levels of 
international trade costs. 
This high import ratio can be corrected by introducing an asymmetry between the 
utility derived by consuming varieties produced by the home country and those produced 
by the ROW. There are at least two ways to introduce bias in consumers’ preferences: by 
making use of the so-called “ideal variety” approach (Lancaster, 1979), or by keeping the 
“love for variety” formulation (Spence,1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) represented by 
equation (2) and introducing share parameters. We follow the second route. 
Let us assume that for Regions i=1,2 the composite  i m  takes the following form:  
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In equation (19) the parameter 13 12 γ ≤ ≤  is a measure of the relative 
preference for varieties produced domestically. If there is no bias in preferences γ  is equal 
to 1/3, while if  13 γ >  consumers of Regions 1 and 2 have a bias in favor of domestic 
varieties (produced in either region).
9 Similarly, for the ROW we have that  3 m  takes the 
following form:  
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where  01 3 θ ≤≤  measures the relative preference in favour of varieties produced in 
Regions 1 and 2. As before, consumers in the ROW do not make any distinction between 
varieties produced in regions 1 and 2.
10   11
Under the same assumptions on the producer side, as in the case without 
consumption bias, the scale of production is the same for all varieties, wherever they are 
produced. Also, the producer price of all varieties produced in the same region is identical 
Table 2 summarizes the effects of introducing bias in preferences for low inter-
regional transport costs (t = 1.1),  1 06 . h =  and  1 βε < . As one would expect, when γ  is 
increased the share in manufacture consumption of varieties produced in the ROW falls.
11 
Table 3 shows the effect of γ  on the distribution of labour for the same parameter 
values. Before looking at the effects of changes inγ , let us point out that an increase in the 
relative size of the ROW induces a more symmetric distribution of population between the 
two domestic regions. The reason for this result is that as the ROW becomes larger, the 
consumption of domestic varieties becomes relatively less important than the consumption 
of foreign varieties, such that the incentive to agglomerate in order to reduce the burden of 
domestic trade costs is somewhat reduced. It still possible, however, to observe that in 
equilibrium population is more concentrated than housing ( ) 11 sh > . As γ  increases, 
labour tends to become somewhat more concentrated in the region with more housing. 
Recall that, in Figure 4, for  1 βε <  and t = 2.3, as τ  increases, there is a stable 
equilibrium where Region 2 is empty of population and another stable equilibrium where 
Region 1 is either empty or has a very small population. As γ  increases from 1/3 towards 
1/2, the threshold combinations of t and τ  at which this occurs fall. In other words a 
dispersed equilibrium that is stable when  13 γ =  may not be so when γ  is higher. 
A final issue is whether the presence of preference bias affects the rate at which 
regions’ size converge as τ  is reduced. Figure 6 maps the effects of reducing import 
protection for the same parameter values as in Tables 2 and 3, and for four different 
values ofγ . The effects increase as γ  rises from 1/3 to 0.40 to 0.45, but fall again for 
04 9 . γ =  (the same pattern is evident in Table 3). This happens because changes in trade 
protection matter very little both when consumers’ desire for imported varieties shrinks to 
zero (γ  approaches 1/2), and when imported varieties are so dominant in the consumption 
of manufactures that there is little incentive to be in the region that produces more 




6.  Summary and conclusions 
 
Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) argue that the import substitution policy followed by 
many developing countries during most of the second half of the twentieth century   12
generated, or at least intensified, a process of population and production concentration, 
leading to the emergence of industrial centres whose production was mainly intended for 
the domestic market. Can trade liberalization affect this geographical structure? 
In order to throw some light on this question, we adapted Helpman’s model to 
analyze the case where a domestic economy composed of two asymmetric regions 
reduces trade barriers on imports from the ROW. As is standard in NEG models, the 
agglomeration forces are generated through the inclusion of a sector that produces 
manufactured varieties under increasing returns to scale whose trade is subject to 
transport costs, and assuming labour is mobile between domestic regions (but not 
between countries). Dispersion forces are generated, as in Helpman (1998), by introducing 
a fixed regional supply of housing, which is not tradable between regions. This model has 
the advantage that it can easily incorporate asymmetries between the regions. 
In this environment, and assuming an asymmetric distribution of housing, a 
reduction in trade costs on imports from the ROW tends to induce, ceteris paribus, a more 
equal distribution of population between the two domestic regions, so that manufactured 
production becomes less concentrated. This result is explained by the fact that, as imports 
becomes cheaper through trade liberalization, consumers seek to minimize the burden of 
housing costs, which are larger in the more populated region because the quantity of 
housing per capita is lower there (labour is always more unequally distributed than 
housing, except when there is no transport costs between domestic regions).  
The picture is essentially the same when we allow for consumer preferences in the 
home country to be biased in favour of domestically produced varieties. In the presence of 
consumption biases, the effect of trade liberalization on regions’ size tends to be larger 
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t=1.1 T=2.3  t=50 
 
Figure 1: A Symmetrical Distribution of Housing ( ) 1 βε > .  Vertical axis: real income in Region 1 minus real income in Region 2 (y).  A positive (negative) value implies an 
incentive to migrate to region 1 (2). Horizontal axis: share of population in Region 1 (s1). If y>0 (<0), s1 tends to increase (decrease) over time, so a stable interior 






t=1.1 t=2.3  t=50 
Figure 2: A Symmetrical Distribution of Housing ( ) 1 βε < . Vertical axis: real income in Region 1 minus real income in Region 2 (y).  A positive (negative) value implies an 
incentive to migrate to region 1 (2). Horizontal axis: share of population in Region 1 (s1). If y>0 (<0), s1 tends to increase (decrease) over time, so a stable interior 







t=1.1 t=2.3  t=50 
 
Figure 3: Asymmetric Distribution of Housing () 1 βε > . Vertical axis: real income in Region 1 minus real income in Region 2 (y).  A positive (negative) value implies an 
incentive to migrate to region 1 (2). Horizontal axis: share of population in Region 1 (s1). If y>0 (<0), s1 tends to increase (decrease) over time, so a stable interior 







t=1.1 t=2.3  t=50 
Figure 4: Asymmetric Distribution of Housing () 1 βε < . Vertical axis: real income in Region 1 minus real income in Region 2 (y).  A positive (negative) value implies an 
incentive to migrate to region 1 (2). Horizontal axis: share of population in Region 1 (s1). If y>0 (<0), s1 tends to increase (decrease) over time, so a stable interior 

























   


















Figure 5. International trade costs and regions’ sizes. Asymmetric distribution of housing. Vertical axis: share of population in Region 1 (s1). Horizontal axis: 
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Figure 6: percentage variation in s1 as τ  is reduced from τ j to 11 . τ = . 
1 10 22 2 0 6 1 1 βεβ ε <= = = =       ;. ,. , . , . ht . 
 





Region 1: manufactured expenditure shares 
() 13 10 6 1 1 9 9      *, ., ., ht L βε <= = =  
τ  1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 6.1 
Domestic  varieties  (R1+R2)  1.1% 2.3% 3.5% 4.8% 6.2% 7.5% 
Imports  from  Region  3  98.9% 97.7% 96.5% 95.2% 93.8% 92.5% 
Note: when t=τ=1, the shares are, respectively, 1% and 99%. 





Region 1: manufactured expenditure shares 
( ) 13 10 6 1 1 9 9      *, ., ., ht L βε <= = =  
τ  1.1 3.1 5.1 7.1 9.1 
γ=1/3   
Domestic varieties (R1+R2)  1.1% 3.5% 6.2% 8.8% 11.3% 
Imports from Region 3  98.9% 96.5% 93.8% 91.2% 88.7% 
γ=0.40       
Domestic varieties (R1+R2)  4.6% 13.7% 21.5% 28.0% 33.4% 
Imports from Region 3  95.4% 86.3% 78.5% 72.0% 66.6% 
γ=0.45       
Domestic varieties (R1+R2)  20.6% 43.0% 54.7% 62.0% 67.0% 
Imports from Region 3  79.4% 57.0% 45.3% 38.0% 33.0% 
γ=0.49       
Domestic varieties (R1+R2)  82.6% 91.7% 94.2% 95.5% 96.3% 
Imports from Region 3  17.4% 8.3% 5.8% 4.5% 3.7% 





Model with consumption bias: L1/L 
( ) 13 10 6 1 1 9 9      *, ., ., ht L βε <= = =   
τ  1.1 3.1 5.1 7.1 9.1 
γ=1/3  0.6003 0.6010 0.6018 0.6025 0.6033 
γ=0.40  0.6013 0.6040 0.6064 0.6085 0.6102 
γ=0.45  0.6061 0.6135 0.6177 0.6205 0.6225 
γ=0.49  0.6290 0.6330 0.6342 0.6348 0.6352 












                       
1 The notion of iceberg costs means that for each unit of an imported variety that is consumed, more 
than 1 unit must be shipped from the exporting region.  
2 Here we follow Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996). This asymmetry in international transport 
costs is innocuous to the results of the model. 
3 t ( ) τ  is the quantity of each variety that must be shipped by a domestic (foreign) firm for 1 unit to 
arrive to the importing region. 
4 As Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) point out, t should be interpreted as “natural” transport 
costs, while τ  is a combination of natural transport costs and artificial trade barriers. 
5 Helpman (1998) assumes the stock of housing is evenly owned by all population. The assumption 
of absentee landlords is innocuous to the results of the model but it simplifies greatly the expression 
for regions’ expenditure. 
6 Because of the circularity introduced by the assumption that labour migrates in response to 
differences in real wages is not possible to obtain closed forms for the variables of interest. The 
analysis of sections 3, 4 and 5 is carried out through the use of numerical simulations. 
7 To be more precise, under a Cobb-Douglas utility function, we have that unless domestic transport 
costs are infinity, no region can ever be empty because the price of housing would be zero and any 
migrant could reach an infinite level of utility when first moving to this region. 
8 By free trade we refer to the case when domestic and international transport costs are the same. 
9 If  12 γ =  we have a closed economy, with the results resembling those of Helpman (1998). 
10 By restricting the possible values taken by γ  and θ , such that  13 γ ≥  and  13 θ ≤ , we rule out 
the possibility of consumers having a greater preference for foreign varieties. 
11 In all simulations it is assumed that consumers of Region 3 have no bias in preferences 
( ) 13 θ = . 
12 The same pattern arises if we look at level changes instead of percentage changes. 